Using the most recent statistical data, two U.S.-based geographers document the changes and level of regional inequality in China for the period 1978-2006, in order to shed light on whether recent government efforts toward inequality reduction have had observable effects. The paper reveals the spatial dynamics that underlie regional inequality by decomposing interprovincial inequality into its interregional and intraregional components, and investigating the growth trajectories of regions and provinces. The authors demonstrate that interprovincial inequality declined during the 1980s, increased in the 1990s, was relatively stable from the late 1990s to 2004, and has declined thereafter. Through closer analysis, they show how the trend in interprovincial inequality up to 2004 has been shaped by countervailing patterns in (declining) intraregional inequality and (increasing) interregional inequality. Since 2004, however, the study reveals that both interregional and intraregional inequalities have declined, reflecting convergence in growth rates among provinces and among regions.
INTRODUCTION
nequality is, no doubt, a burning issue in China. The Gini coefficient, which measures economic inequality in society, was estimated to be 0.33 in 1980 and rose to 0.45 to 0.47 in recent years (Sisci, 2005; World Bank, 2005; Urbanization, 2006) . Such rate of increase, according to the World Bank, was the fastest in the world (Editorial, 2005, p. 9) . Spatial inequalities among different regions and between rural and urban areas have also been on the rise.
The large and persistent inequality in China is increasingly seen as attributable to the country's economic success and as a problematic development (Pei, 2006; Bernstein, 2007; Lee and Selden, 2007) . Widening gaps between the rich (places) and poor (places) have induced massive migration from inland to coastal regions (e.g., and have motivated, if not directly provoked, protests and dissent across the country (Wang and Hu, 1999; O'Brien, 2002, p. 141; Sisci, 2005; China Party, 2007; . And, heightened concerns over social and political instability as a result of economic polarization have propelled the Chinese government to implement and endorse programs that aim at alleviating inequality. For example, one of the Ninth Five-Year Plan's (1996 Plan's ( -2000 objectives was to reduce poverty. In 1999, the "Western Development Program" (xibu da kaifa) was launched to boost the 1 Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, 1255 Bunche Hall, Box 951524, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1524 (fan@geog.ucla.edu; mjsun@ucla.edu) . The authors wish to thank the National Science Foundation (BCS-0455107) and the UCLA Academic Senate for funding the research for this paper. We also thank Kam Wing Chan for his comments on a recent version of the paper and Chase Langford for producing the maps and figures. economic development of 12 provincial-level units (hereafter provinces) in western China. Since 2004, government leaders have been advancing the concept of a Pan-Pearl River Delta region as a means to promote economic growth of both wealthy and less developed provinces in southern and southwestern China (Yeung, 2005; Sun and Fan, 2008) . Furthermore, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) promotes the concept of "harmonious socialist society" (shehui zhuyi hexie shehui), one that is defined also in terms of inequality reduction (Editorial, 2006, p. 4) . The Plan addresses regional inequality through the notion of "coordinated development between regions" (quyu xietiao fazhan), which emphasizes the need to develop laggard and slow-growth regions, especially those in western, northeastern, and central parts of the country (Fan, 2006) . This paper's initial objective is to provide updated information on the level and changes of regional inequality in China by using the latest data, including the year 2006, in order to shed light on whether recent efforts toward inequality reduction have had observable effects. A second objective is to reveal the spatial dynamics underlying inequality, by identifying regions and provinces whose growth trajectories influenced the level and changes of regional inequality.
RECENT RESEARCH ON REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN CHINA
Numerous studies have addressed issues of inequality and regional inequality in China. 2 Most examine inequality among provinces, among groups of provinces, or between rural and urban areas. Output, consumption, and income are the most popular indicators of economic development; and the coefficient of variation (CV), Gini coefficient, and Theil index are the most commonly used measures of inequality.
Despite the diversity of data and methods used, studies on the 1980s and 1990s have yielded rather consistent observations about interprovincial and interregional inequalities; namely, interprovincial inequality declined during the 1980s and showed signs of increase in the 1990s, while inequality between the eastern coastal region and the rest of China was on an upward trajectory since the 1980s (e.g., Lyons, 1991; Tsui, 1991; Fan, 1995a; Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Jian et al., 1996; Wei and Ma, 1996; Long, 1999; Wu, 2000; Fujita and Hu, 2001; Demurger et al., 2002; Lu and Wang, 2002; Shan, 2002; Zhang and Zhang, 2003) . These studies have also identified a variety of determinants that explained changes in regional inequality. While some researchers highlight factor endowments such as location, labor, and infrastructure (e.g., Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Hare and West, 1999; Bao et al., 2002; Demurger et al., 2002) , many more conclude that factors related to policy are most crucial. These factors include regional policy that boosted capital investment (including foreign) in coastal provinces and open zones (e.g., Fan 1995a Fan , 1997 Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Wei and Fan, 2000) ; decentralization of central control (e.g., Tsui 1991; Veeck, 1993; Wei, 1996; Lin, 1999) ; central fiscal transfers to less developed regions (e.g., Wang, 2007) ; industrialization and economic agglomerations (Fan, 1995b; Tsui, 1998; Yao and Zhang, 2001; Wei and Kim, 2002) ; and improved factor mobility due to market expansion (e.g., Jian et al., 1996) . The central role of policy in driving regional economic growth suggests that broad-brushed notions of divergence and convergence, such as those based on the inverted-U model, are of limited utility for explaining changes in regional inequality in China.
2 One recent example is the project on Poverty and Inequality in China launched in 2004 by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER), which resulted in two international conferences, a special issue in Review of Income and Wealth, and an edited volume in Chinese (Cai and Wan, 2006; Wan, 2007) .
More recent studies, especially those conducted by economists who employed econometric and decomposition techniques, have produced detailed findings that lend further support to the central role of policy. For example, Kanbur and Zhang (2005) conclude that regional inequality in China is explained by three key policy variables-the ratio of heavy industry to output, the degree of decentralization, and the degree of openness. Other studies, including the ones by Zhang and Zhang (2003) , Wan and Zhou (2005) , and Wan et al. (2007) , have identified capital input (including domestic and foreign) as the most important determinant of regional inequality. Tsui (2007) finds that the contribution of capital to regional inequality is large and increasing. Moreover, studies that examine changes since the early 1950s show that regional inequality responded to policy shocks-such as the Great Leap Forward, the Third Front, the Cultural Revolution, the economic reforms since the late 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in the early 1990s Dong, 2006) . Ho and Li's (2007) study illustrates, in summary, that policy has led to "structural breaks" in the trend of regional inequality.
Publications that have appeared over the last several years have extended the period of empirical analysis to the early 2000s. These efforts are potentially useful to inform policymakers whether the widening of regional gaps identified for the 1990s has continued unabated and if recent government efforts to halt such widening have been successful. Most of these studies, however, employ data on conditions before or up to 2002 (e.g., Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Dong, 2006; Ho and Li, 2007; Tsui, 2007; Wang, 2007) . Two exceptions are the works by Xu and Li (2006) and Wang (2007) , who examine per capita GDP up to 2004 and 2005 respectively, both noting a slight decline in interprovincial inequality beginning around 2003. This paper seeks to provide further evidence on the recent trend of regional inequality and its decomposition and is one of the first that investigate regional inequality in China up to the year 2006 (see also the paper by Chan and Wang, 2008 that follows).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis aims at documenting changes in regional inequality in China from 1978, the year the economic reforms began, to 2006, the most recent year for which data is available.
Provinces and Regions
We examine inequality among provinces, among regions, and within regions. To facilitate comparison over time, we merge Chongqing, which became a centrally administered municipality in 1997, with Sichuan, because data for Chongqing independent of Sichuan for the period before 1997 are largely unavailable. On the other hand, data availability permits the treatment of Hainan, which became a province in 1988, separately from Guangdong. It is worth noting that our analysis includes Tibet, which is often omitted in inequality studies (e.g., Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Chen, 2006) . In short, our analysis includes a total of 30 provinces.
The "three economic belts" scheme ( Fig. 1 ) based on the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986 -1990 ) is both descriptive of and commonly used to analyze regional inequality in China ( Fig.  1 ) (e.g., Fan, 1995a; Lee, 2000; . 3 Researchers have also employed variants of the three economic belts to study regional inequality. For example, in some studies, Guangxi is considered a central region rather than eastern region province because it is significantly less developed than the rest of the eastern region (e.g., Wan et al., 2007) . Some researchers remove Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai from the eastern region or merge them with adjacent eastern region provinces (e.g., Tsui, 1991; Wu, 2000) . Sometimes, the central and western regions are combined to form an inland category (e.g., Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Fujita and Hu, 2001; Zhang, 1999, 2005) . More recently, due in part to the Western Development Program, researchers have begun to group not only Guangxi but also Inner Mongolia (from the central region) into the western region (see, for example, Tsui, 2007, note 2) . In addition, some recent studies employ the four-region divisions described in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (e.g., Xu and Li, 2006; Wang, 2007) . 4 Each of the above regionalization constructs can reveal some aspects of regional inequality, but the level and trend of interregional (between-region) and intraregional (within-region) inequalities are incompatible among studies that employ different schemes. In this paper, we use the original three economic belts categorization in order to facilitate comparison with existing studies that also use this scheme.
GDP and Population Data
We employ per capita GDP as an indicator of the overall level of economic development. This indicator has three advantages. First, per capita GDP is by far the most commonly used indicator of economic development and well-being, for China and elsewhere, and thus our findings can be readily compared with many other studies (see also Tsui, 2007, note 4) . Second, analysis of inequality trends requires time-series data, and GDP is among the most readily and consistently available indicator of provincial economic development in China for the past several decades. Third, GDP includes all economic sectors and is superior to indicators that suffer from double counting, such as gross value of industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO), and to those that omit the service sector, such as GVIAO and national income (NI).
Three data issues concerning per capita GDP are worth noting. The first concerns population data. Chinese data on urban population and migration are known to be problematic (Scharping, 2001; Chan and Hu, 2003; Zhou and Ma, 2005; Chan, 2007) , but even estimates of population totals vary among sources and are not problem-free. The first major source of population data is the annual National Sample Surveys on Population Changes conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which yield year-end population statistics usually reported in annual volumes of the China Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical yearbooks (hereafter yearbook source). 5 Censuses (e.g., the 1990 and 2000 censuses) and intercensus sample surveys (e.g., the 1995 and 2005 One-Percent Sample Surveys) constitute a second source, which give population counts for the years at which the surveys were taken (hereafter census source). For some provinces, however, population estimates from the census source differ considerably from pre-census and post-census estimates from the yearbook source. 6 Use of both the yearbook and census sources may result in abrupt breaks in the population data series as well as an artificially inflated or deflated per capita GDP for some provinces. In our analysis, therefore, we rely primarily on the yearbook source. 7 The second issue involves reliability of official GDP data, which is increasingly questioned (e.g., Rawski, 2001; Holz, 2004 ). China's first Economic Census conducted in 2004 also showed that previously published data contained overestimates of GDP for some 5 The annual National Sample Surveys on Population Changes document resident population (changzhu renkou), including people who have local hukou and those who do not have local hukou but have resided in the place for over six months (one year, for surveys before 1995) or have left their hukou location for more than six months (one year, for surveys before 1995) (Hu, 2005) . Accordingly, this source includes not only local residents but also migrants (over one year before 1995 and over six months since 1995). A six-month length-of-stay criterion is increasingly popular for defining de facto population (see, for example, Chan and Wang, 2008, note 26) . 6 For the discrepancies in the population estimates reported for 1999, 2000, and 2001 from the two sources, see . Concerned that official population estimates may not have taken full account of interprovincial migration, Tsui (2007) uses the yearbook source for the period before 1982 but extrapolates from the census population figures for all years after 1982.
7 Specifically, the bulk of our population data is based on provincial statistical yearbooks for 2006, the China Statistical Yearbook for various years, and the China Compendium of Statistics 1949 -2004 (NBS, 2005 ; we compute population for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 by averaging each preceding year with the year that follows (e.g., averaging 1989 and 1991 to obtain the 1990 population). For Guangdong, whose statistical yearbook reports only persons who have local hukou (see also note 5), we estimate the population by dividing GDP by per capita GDP (based on resident population and published in Guangdong's statistical yearbook for 2006). provinces and underestimates for others. Accordingly, in 2006, the NBS released adjusted GDP data for the period prior to 2004 (NBS, 2006 . 8 In this paper, we take advantage of these newly released adjusted data series. In our analysis, GDP data for the period from 1978 to 1992 are drawn from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949 -2004 (NBS, 2005 (NBS, 2007) . 9 The third issue relates to the computation of real per capita GDP, which usually is performed in one of the following two ways. First, real GDP estimates for the entire time series are derived from the official nominal GDP data in conjunction with the published annual growth rates of real GDP. This approach, in short, relies on official GDP deflators. 10 The second approach involves using other deflators, such as national or provincial price indices (e.g., Tsui, 2007) . In this paper, we use the first approach to convert per capita GDP data in current prices into 2005 constant prices.
Inequality Measures
The most popular measures of regional inequality fall within three groups: dispersion indices, Lorenz Curve indices, and entropy or information theoretic indices. The coefficient of variation (CV) is a popular dispersion index that is easily computed, but is sensitive to outliers. The Gini coefficient is a widely used index based on the Lorenz Curve, but is unduly influenced by high values. Both the CV and Gini coefficient evaluate the overall level of inequality and are not readily decomposable. A major advantage of entropy indices, such as the Theil index, is that they can be decomposed into additive terms that depict the inequality among and within groups of elements in a system (Theil, 1967) . 11 The Theil index, however, is sensitive to observations with low incomes (Shorrocks, 2006) . Because inequality measures are different with regard to their properties and are based on different social welfare functions, a widely accepted practice has been to use a variety of measures and compare their results. In our analysis, we measure inequality by the CV, Gini coefficient, and Theil indexan approach quite popular in the literature on China's regional inequality (e.g., Wu, 2000; Dong, 2006) . Appendix 1 describes the methods by which these indices are computed.
Interprovincial Inequality
The CV, Theil index, and Gini coefficient all reveal a similar trajectory of interprovincial inequality for the period from 1978 to 2006 (Fig. 2) . Interprovincial inequality fluctuated in the late 1970s, declined during the 1980s, rose during the 1990s, remained relatively stable or increased only slightly from about 1999 to 2004, and declined for two consecutive years from 2004 to 2006. The relative levels and pace of change of interprovincial inequality, however, vary between the three measures. The CV depicts a sharper decline of inequality during the 1980s than the Theil index and Gini coefficient, whereas the Theil index reveals a more rapid increase of inequality during the 1990s than the other two indices. The net result is, interprovincial inequality in 2006 was about 22 percent higher, 9 percent higher, and 8 percent lower, than the 1978 level, according to the Theil index, Gini coefficient, and CV, respectively (see also Table 1 ).
The peaks and troughs shown in Figure 2 lend support to the notion that policy and policy changes are critical factors in explaining changes in regional inequality. We will examine the details in the next two sections. But briefly, the economic reforms that began in the late 1970s boosted the development of several eastern region provinces that had previously been laggards, thus reducing interprovincial inequality in the 1980s. Despite the negative ramifications of Tiananmen in 1989, Deng's southern tour in 1992 gave new life to the open-door policy and full-throttle development of the eastern region, thus also increasing interprovincial inequality in the 1990s. The relative plateau of inequality reached in the late 1990s and the subsequent decline since 2004 hint at a downward trend of interprovincial inequality, possibly related to efforts such as the Western Development Program and recent renewal of attention to the old industrial regions in northeastern China.
Interregional and Intraregional Inequalities
Decomposition of the Theil index into its interregional (between-region) and intraregional (within-region) components shows that these components' contributions varied over time (Fig. 3) . 12 Between 1978 and 1993, and especially before 1990, intraregional inequality was considerably higher than interregional inequality. During that period, intraregional inequality overwhelmingly determined the overall trend of interprovincial inequality; when the former declined, the latter also did. Between 1990 and 2004, interregional inequality increased sharply and continuously, whereas intraregional inequality first declined and then remained quite stable. In 1993, interregional inequality overtook intraregional inequality, and 12 See equations (3) through (7) in Appendix 1. GDP, 1978 GDP, -2006 since then has replaced the latter as the main determinant of change in interprovincial inequality. Specifically, since the early 1990s, when interregional inequality rose, interprovincial inequality also followed suit. Finally, since 2004 both interregional and intraregional inequalities have declined, thus culminating in a conspicuous drop in interprovincial inequality.
Fig. 2. Interprovincial inequality in per capita
The above decomposition exercise shows that examination of overall interprovincial inequality alone masks important changes between and within regions. The decline of interprovincial inequality during the 1980s might be interpreted as evidence for the reform policy's equilibrating effect and even support for regional convergence, as predicted by the inverted-U model (e.g., Yang, 1994; Duncan and Tian, 1999) . As shown in Figure 3 , however, interregional inequality was on its way to a rapid increase in the late 1980s, which subsequently pushed interprovincial inequality toward a steep rise in the 1990s. Figure 4 illustrates the eastern region's accelerated growth in per capita GDP since the 1990s, such that the gap between it and the central and western regions continued to enlarge throughout the remainder of the study period (see also Table 1 ). Clearly, this gap accounted for the increase in interregional inequality since the early 1990s (Fig. 3) .
The decline of intraregional inequality during the 1980s, shown in Figure 3 , also masks specific changes within regions. In Figure 5 , intraregional inequality is further decomposed into respective contributions by the three regions. Throughout the period from 1978 to 2006, intraregional inequality in the eastern region was considerably higher than in the other two regions and remained the main determinant of the trend in overall intraregional inequality. Intraregional inequality in the eastern region was high in 1978, but declined thereafter until 1993; it then increased through 2004 and again declined thereafter. In the central region, intraregional inequality was small and exhibited an overall decline. Intraregional inequality in the western region was even smaller and remained largely unchanged over the entire study period. In summary, interprovincial inequality within the eastern region was mainly responsible for the trajectory of overall intraregional inequality. Table 1 , along with Figures 6-9, shed further light on interregional and intraregional inequalities by revealing variations in the level and growth of per capita GDP across provinces. We examine the following four cross-sections: (1) 1978, when the economic reforms began; (2) 1990, which marked the beginning of sharp increase in interprovincial and interregional inequalities; (3) 2000, around the time interprovincial inequality became more stable; and (4) 2006, the most recent year for which data is available. Table 1 documents each province's per capita GDP and its rank at each of the cross-sections as well as the average growth rate during the three periods 1978-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2006. Figures 6-9 depict standard deviations from the mean for each cross-section, which highlight the geography of economic development by identifying the leaders and laggards at specific years. We use 0.25 and -0.25 standard deviations respectively as arbitrary benchmarks to define the provincial leaders and laggards-leaders are those at 0.25 or more standard deviation above the mean, and laggards are those at -0.25 or more standard deviation below the mean.
Level and Growth of Per Capita GDP in China's Provinces
In 1978, only five provinces, including Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Liaoning in the eastern region and Heilongjiang in the central region, were identified as leaders in economic . 1 2 1 1 . 3 9 1 0 . 2 9 T i a n j i n 3 , 4 5 4 6 , 9 0 7 1 9 , 1 8 2 3 9 , 3 8 4 3 3 3 3 5 . 9 4 1 0 . 7 5 1 2 . 7 4 Hebei 1,380 3,062 9,204 16,598 8 14 11 11 6.86 11.64 10.33 L i a o n i n g 2 , 2 8 2 5 , 0 3 3 1 1 , 6 2 9 2 1 , 3 4 0 5 4 8 8 6 . 8 1 8 . 7 4 1 0 . 6 5 S h a n g h a i 5 , 9 6 8 1 1 , 8 6 8 3 3 , 2 3 8 5 6 , 4 8 9 1 1 1 1 5 . 9 0 1 0 . 8 5 9 . 2 4 J i a n g s u 1 , 3 5 1 4 , 1 3 6 1 4 , 0 9 0 2 7 , 8 5 9 1 0 9 5 5 9 . 7 7 1 3 . 0 4 1 2 . 0 3 Z h e j i a n g 1 , 2 3 9 4 , 1 3 9 1 5 , 6 6 9 3 0 , 7 3 4 1 5 8 4 4 1 0 . 5 7 1 4 . 2 4 1 1 . development (Fig. 6) . They constituted the old industrial regions of China in the pre-reform period-the three centrally administered municipalities and the heavy industrial bases in the northeast. In total, 18 provinces were laggards. Between 1978 and 1990, however, the average annual growth rates of the 1978 leaders, ranging from 5.70 to 7.12 percent, were below the national (7.78 percent), eastern-region (8.20 percent), and central-region (7.16 percent) averages (Table 1) . At the time when the old industrial regions experienced slow growth, several coastal provinces-Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong-that had ranked much lower in 1978 (between tenth and nineteenth), emerged as a new growth core. Their growth rates, ranging from 8.55 to 10.64 percent, were higher than the eastern region's average and considerably higher than the national average. The net effect was a convergence in per capita GDP within the eastern region (Fig. 5) , which also fostered a decline in intraregional and interprovincial inequalities for the nation as a whole (Fig. 3) . However, as discussed earlier, the decline of interprovincial inequality during this period did not constitute long-term regional convergence but rather was a short-lived phenomenon-one that was due to the offsetting effects of the more developed provinces' slow growth and the relatively less developed provinces' rapid growth (Fan, 1995a; Jian et al., 1996; Demurger, 2001) .
By 1990, therefore, not only had the provinces in the new growth core improved their levels of economic development but they had also risen in rank (from between tenth and nineteenth to between seventh and eleventh; see Table 1 ). Guangdong, in particular, transformed itself from a laggard into a leader; Fujian and Zhejiang also left the laggards group and joined the "near-the-mean" (-0.24 to 0.24) category (Fig. 7) . Interestingly, Xinjiang moved from the "near the mean" group to become a leader in 1990, reflecting the province's economic gains from trade with Central Asian countries (Loughlin and Pannell, 2001) .
During the period 1990-2000, provinces in the new growth core-Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong-continued to grow at rapid rates (12.64 to 14.24 percent, compared to 12.20 percent for the eastern region and 10.84 percent for the nation), so that by 2000 their ranks in per capita GDP had improved to between fourth and ninth (Table 1) . By 2000, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong had all become leaders (Fig. 8) . Between 1990 and 2000, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin's growth rates were still slower than those in the new growth core, but the former group had improved to near or above the national average, ranging from 10.75 percent to 11.39 percent (Table 1) . Accordingly, most of the easternregion provinces had relatively high growth rates, considerably higher than those in the central and western regions. 13 Rather than regional convergence, therefore, the period 1990-2000 was marked by a rapid increase in interregional inequality (Figs. 3 and 4) .
By the period 2000-2006, however, the central region's rate of growth (11.90 percent) had overtaken that of the eastern region (11.75 percent), and the western region also enjoyed a 13 Specifically, the average annual growth rate of the eastern region was 12.20 percent, respectively 2.97 and 3.57 percentage points higher than those of the central region (9.23 percent) and western region (8.63 percent). Table 1 ). The net effect is that the three regions' average rates of growth became very similar-all within one percentage point of difference. At the provincial level, growth rates also converged during this period, as evidenced by a lower CV (0.15) compared to the previous two periods (both 0.20). Given the convergence of growth rates between regions and between provinces, it is no surprise that both interregional and intraregional inequalities remained relatively stable and eventually declined (Fig.  3) . Nevertheless, the absolute size of regional gaps remained large. The ratio between the eastern and central regions declined only slightly, from 1.94 in 2000 to 1.93 in 2006; and that between the eastern and western regions continued to increase, from 2.42 to 2.53 (Table 1) . Table 1 , in conjunction with Figure 9 , shows that the changes that led to the gradual halting of inequality increases in recent years were not regional in scale, but were due to the growth trajectories of selected provinces. The new growth core continued to grow rapidly, but at the same time that Shandong moved into the leading position, Fujian retreated to the "near-the-mean" group (Fig. 9) . Inner Mongolia was an outlier in economic growth-its average growth rate of 16.81 percent was the highest of all provinces and responsible for its leaving the group of laggards and joining the "near-the-mean" group in 2006. 14 Hubei and 14 Inner Mongolia's remarkable recent growth can be explained by infusions of capital from domestic and foreign sources as well as the emergence of successful industrial enterprises producing dairy products (Inner Mongolia's, 2006; The Gracious, 2007) . Hunan in the central region and Sichuan in the western region registered growth rates above 12 percent, higher than or rivaling the growth of many provinces in the eastern region. In summary, while most central-and western-region provinces remained laggards (Fig. 9) , selected provinces within these regions exhibited sufficiently rapid growth in recent years so that both interregional and interprovincial inequalities have declined since 2004.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
By documenting and decomposing interprovincial inequality of per capita GDP from the beginning of economic reforms to the most recent year for which data are available, we have shown in this paper that the trend of regional inequality in China is characterized by three distinct phases. During the 1980s, interprovincial inequality declined, primarily due to a decrease in intraregional inequality in the eastern region, attributable to the emergence of a new growth core of previously less developed provinces and the slow growth of the old industrial ones. In the 1990s, the eastern region as a whole grew rapidly, interregional inequality surged, and so did interprovincial inequality. From the late 1990s to 2006, both across provinces and across the eastern, central, and western regions, growth rates of per capita GDP exhibited some convergence. Thus, despite the persistence of large gaps between provinces and between regions in absolute terms, interregional and intraregional inequalities first became stable and then declined, so that interprovincial inequality also declined between 2004 and 2006. Our observation that interprovincial inequality declined for two consecutive years lends support to the notion that the Chinese government's programs and efforts since the late 1990s to reduce regional inequality have had some initial success. A convergence of findings from recent studies, which highlight the importance of policy and capital input, also supports this argument. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis shows that much of the recent change was related to selected provinces in the central and western regions, most notably Inner Mongolia, which enjoyed relatively rapid growth, rather than a wholesale boosting of growth in China's inland regions. It is thus still too early to tell if the decline in regional inequality would continue and sustain a reversal from the trend of the 1990s. Analyses of determinants of economic growth, including and in addition to policy, are necessary to fully explain the observed trends. Despite the above cautionary notes, the empirical observations in this paper highlight an encouraging recent phase in China's space economy and the possibility of a more balanced and less polarized pattern of regional development.
APPENDIX 1
The empirical analysis in this paper uses the following inequality measures: 1. The coefficient of variation (CV) for per capita GDP is defined as: ,
where y i is the per capita GDP of province i; N is the number of provinces (30); and is the mean of y i . This is often referred to as the unweighted CV, as distinct from the weighted coefficient of variation (CV w ) that weights the deviation of each province by its population. CV w can be viewed as an estimator of the disparity among individuals nationwide (Lyons, 1991; Fujita and Hu, 2001) . Since this paper's focus is on regional inequality-specifically, the disparity between provinces-we chose to use the unweighted CV.
The Gini coefficient is calculated as:
, ( 2 ) where N is the number of provinces (30) and y i is the per capita GDP of the i th province arranged in ascending order (Krämer, 1998; Lu and Wang, 2002) .
3. The Theil index (1967) is defined as follows:
where x i is the proportion of population of province i to the national population and y i is the proportion of GDP of province i to the national GDP. I (y:x) can be decomposed into I(y:x) = I 0 (y:x) + (y:x) ,
The first term on the right I 0 (y:x) measures interregional inequality, whereas the second is a weighted sum (or average) of intraregional inequalities. Specifically, 
